Art and Estimation

picture of man looking at art objectsInterpretation in art refers to the attribution of meaning to a work. A betoken on which people often disagree is whether the artist'due south or author's intention is relevant to the interpretation of the work. In the Anglo-American analytic philosophy of art, views almost interpretation branch into two major camps: intentionalism and anti-intentionalism, with an initial focus on one art, namely literature.

The anti-intentionalist maintains that a work's meaning is entirely adamant by linguistic and literary conventions, thereby rejecting the relevance of the author's intention. The underlying assumption of this position is that a work enjoys autonomy with respect to meaning and other aesthetically relevant properties. Actress-textual factors, such as the author's intention, are neither necessary nor sufficient for meaning conclusion. This early position in the analytic tradition is often called conventionalism considering of its strong accent on convention. Anti-intentionalism gradually went out of favor at the finish of the 20th century, only it has seen a revival in the so-called value-maximizing theory, which recommends that the interpreter seek value-maximizing interpretations constrained past convention and, according to a different version of the theory, by the relevant contextual factors at the fourth dimension of the work's production.

By contrast, the initial brand of intentionalism—actual intentionalism—holds that interpreters should concern themselves with the author's intention, for a work's significant is afflicted by such intention. At that place are at least 3 versions of bodily intentionalism. The absolute version identifies a piece of work'south pregnant fully with the author'southward intention, therefore allowing that an author tin can intend her work to mean whatsoever she wants it to mean. The extreme version acknowledges that the possible meanings a piece of work can sustain accept to be constrained by convention. According to this version, the writer's intention picks the correct significant of the work as long as information technology fits i of the possible meanings; otherwise, the work ends up being meaningless. The moderate version claims that when the author'south intention does non match whatsoever of the possible meanings, pregnant is fixed instead by convention and perhaps besides context.

A second make of intentionalism, which finds a middle course between actual intentionalism and anti-intentionalism, is hypothetical intentionalism. According to this position, a work's pregnant is the advisable audition'southward all-time hypothesis almost the author'due south intention based on publicly available information about the author and her work at the time of the piece's production. A variation on this position attributes the intention to a hypothetical writer who is postulated past the interpreter and who is constituted past work features. Such authors are sometimes said to be fictional because they, being purely conceptual, differ decisively from flesh-and-claret authors.

This article elaborates on these theories of estimation and considers their notable objections. The debate about interpretation covers other art forms in addition to literature. The theories of interpretation are likewise extended across many of the arts. This broad outlook is assumed throughout the commodity, although null said is affected fifty-fifty if a narrow focus on literature is adopted.

Tabular array of Contents

  1. Key Concepts: Intention, Meaning, and Interpretation
  2. Anti-Intentionalism
    1. The Intentional Fallacy
    2. Beardsley'southward Speech Human action Theory of Literature
    3. Notable Objections and Replies
  3. Value-Maximizing Theory
    1. Overview
    2. Notable Objections and Replies
  4. Actual Intentionalism
    1. Absolute Version
    2. Extreme Version
    3. Moderate Version
    4. Objections to Actual Intentionalism
  5. Hypothetical Intentionalism
    1. Overview
    2. Notable Objections and Replies
  6. Hypothetical Intentionalism and the Hypothetical Artist
    1. Overview
    2. Notable Objections and Replies
  7. Determination
  8. References and Further Reading

one. Primal Concepts: Intention, Meaning, and Estimation

It is common for us to ask questions about works of fine art due to puzzlement or curiosity. Sometimes we do non understand the bespeak of the work. What is the betoken of, for example, Metamorphosis by Kafka or Duchamp's Fountain? Sometimes at that place is ambiguity in a work and we want it resolved. For instance, is the final sequence of Christopher Nolan'south film Inception reality or another dream? Or practise ghosts actually exist in Henry James'southward The Turn of the Spiral? Sometimes we make hypotheses about details in a work. For example, does the adult female in white in Raphael'southward The School of Athens represent Hypatia? Is the conch in William Golding'due south Lord of the Flies a symbol for civilization and democracy?

What these questions have in common is that all of them seek after things that go beyond what the work literally presents or says. They are all concerned with the implicit contents of the piece of work or, for simplicity, with the meanings of a piece of work. A distinction can be drawn betwixt two kinds of meaning in terms of scope. Significant can be global in the sense that information technology concerns the work'southward theme, thesis, or point. For instance, an audience first encountering Duchamp'south Fountain would want to know Duchamp's point in producing this readymade or, put otherwise, what the work as a whole is made to convey. The same goes for Kafka's Metamorphosis, which contains so bizarre a plot as to make the reader wonder what the story is all about. Meaning can as well be local insofar as it is about what a part of a work conveys. Inquiries into the meaning of a particular sequence in Christopher Nolan'south picture show, the adult female in Raphael'southward fresco, or the conch in William Golding'due south Lord of the Flies are directed at but part of the work.

Nosotros are said to be interpreting when trying to find out answers to questions near the meaning of a work. In other words, interpretation is the endeavour to aspect piece of work-pregnant. Here "attribute" tin mean "recover," which is retrieving something already existing in a piece of work; or it can more weakly hateful "impose," which entails ascribing a meaning to a work without ontologically creating anything. Many of the major positions in the fence endorse either the impositional view or the retrieval view.

When an interpretative question arises, a frequent way to bargain with it is to resort to the creator'due south intention. Nosotros may enquire the creative person to reveal her intention if such an opportunity is available; nosotros may also check what she says about her work in an interview or autobiography. If we have access to her personal documents such as diaries or letters, they also will become our interpretative resources. These are all bear witness of the artist'southward intention. When the testify is compelling, we accept proficient reason to believe it reveals the artist's intention.

Certainly, at that place are cases in which external evidence of the artist's intention is absent-minded, including when the work is anonymous. This poses no difficulty for philosophers who view appeal to artistic intention as crucial, for they accept that internal evidence—the work itself—is the best prove of the creative person's intention. About of the time, shut attention to details of the work will lead us to what the artist intended the work to mean.

Only what is intention exactly? Intention is a kind of mental country usually characterized every bit a blueprint or plan in the artist's mind to be realized in her creative cosmos. This rough view of intention is sometimes refined into the reductive analysis one volition find in a contemporaneous textbook of philosophy of listen: intention is constituted by conventionalities and desire. Some actual intentionalists explain the nature of intention from a Wittgensteinian perspective: authorial intention is viewed as the purposive construction of the work that can be discerned past close inspection. This view challenges the supposition that intentions are ever private and logically contained of the work they cause, which is often interpreted every bit a position held by anti-intentionalists.

A 2005 proposal holds that intentions are executive attitudes toward plans (Livingston). These attitudes are firm merely defeasible commitments to interim on them. Contra the reductive analysis of intention, this view holds that intentions are distinct and real mental states that serve a range of functions irreducible to other mental states.

Clarifying each of these basic terms (meaning, interpretation, and intention) requires an essay-length treatment that cannot exist washed here. For electric current purposes, it suffices to introduce the aforesaid views and proposals commonly assumed. Bear in mind that for the near part the debate over art interpretation proceeds without consensus on how to ascertain these terms, and clarifications appear merely when necessary.

2. Anti-Intentionalism

Anti-intentionalism is considered the first theory of interpretation to emerge in the analytic tradition. It is normally seen as affiliated with the New Criticism movement that was prevalent in the middle of the twentieth century. The position was initially a reaction against biographical criticism, the main idea of which is that the interpreter, to grasp the meaning of a work, needs to study the life of the author because the work is seen equally reflecting the author'southward mental world. This arroyo led to people considering the author'south biographical information rather than her piece of work. Literary criticism became criticism of biography, not criticism of literary works. Against this trend, literary critic William K. Wimsatt and philosopher Monroe C. Beardsley coauthored a seminal newspaper "The Intentional Fallacy" in 1946, marker the starting point of the intention fence. Beardsley afterwards extended his anti-intentionalist stance across the arts in his monumental book Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism ([1958] 1981a).

a. The Intentional Fallacy

The main idea of the intentional fallacy is that appeal to the artist's intention outside the work is fallacious, considering the work itself is the verdict of what meaning it bears. This contention is based on the anti-intentionalist's ontological assumption about works of art.

This underlying assumption is that a work of art enjoys autonomy with respect to pregnant and other aesthetically relevant properties. As Beardsley'southward Principle of Autonomy shows, critical statements will in the end need to be tested against the piece of work itself, not against factors outside information technology. To give Beardsley's example, whether a statue symbolizes human destiny depends not on what its maker says but on our existence able to make out that theme from the statue on the ground of our knowledge of creative conventions: if the statue shows a human being confined to a cage, we may well conclude that the statue indeed symbolizes man destiny, for by convention the image of confinement fits that alleged theme. The anti-intentionalist principle hence follows: the interpreter should focus on what she can observe in the piece of work itself—the internal evidence—rather than on external evidence, such equally the creative person's biography, to reveal her intentions.

Anti-intentionalism is sometimes called conventionalism because it sees convention equally necessary and sufficient in determining work-meaning. On this view, the artist's intention at all-time underdetermines meaning even when operating successfully. This can be seen from the famous argument offered by Wimsatt and Beardsley: either the artist'due south intention is successfully realized in the work, or it fails; if the intention is successfully realized in the piece of work, appeal to external prove of the creative person's intention is not necessary (we can detect the intention from the work); if it fails, such appeal becomes insufficient (the intention turns out to be extraneous to the work). The conclusion is that an entreatment to external prove of the creative person'southward intention is either unnecessary or insufficient. As the 2nd premise of the statement shows, the artist's intention is bereft in determining meaning for the reason that convention lone tin do the trick. Every bit a result, the overall argument entails the irrelevance of external bear witness of the artist's intention. To recollect of such prove as relevant commits the intentional fallacy.

In that location is a second way to formulate the intentional fallacy. Since the artist does not always successfully realize her intention, the inference is invalid from the premise that the artist intended her work to hateful p to the conclusion that the work in question does mean p. Therefore, the term "intentional fallacy" has two layers of meaning: normatively, it refers to the questionable principle of estimation that external prove of intent should exist appealed to; ontologically, it refers to the fallacious inference from probable intention to work-meaning.

b. Beardsley's Speech Human action Theory of Literature

Beardsley at a after betoken develops an ontology of literature in favor of anti-intentionalism (1981b, 1982). Reviving Plato's imitation theory of art, Beardsley claims that fictional works are essentially imitations of illocutionary acts. Briefly put, illocutionary acts are performed by utterances in particular contexts. For instance, when a detective, convinced that someone is the killer, points his finger at that person and utters the sentence "you did it," the detective is performing the illocutionary act of accusing someone. What illocutionary human action is being performed is traditionally construed as jointly determined by the speaker'due south intention to perform that act, the words uttered, and the relevant conditions in that particular context. Other examples of illocutionary acts include asserting, warning, castigating, asking, and the like.

Literary works can exist seen as utterances; that is, texts used in a particular context to perform different illocutionary acts by authors. Nevertheless, Beardsley claims that in the case of fictional works in item, the purported illocutionary strength will always be removed and so equally to brand the utterance an fake of that illocutionary act. When an attempted deed is insufficiently performed, it ends up being represented or imitated. For instance, if I say "please pass me the salt" in my dining room when no one except me is at that place, I finish up representing (imitating) the illocutionary act of requesting because there is no uptake from the intended audience. Since the illocutionary act in this case is only imitated, it qualifies as a fictional human activity. This is why Beardsley sees fiction every bit representation.

Consider the uptake status in the instance of fictional works. Such works are not addressed to the audition equally a talk is: there is no concrete context in which the audience tin can be readily identified. The uttered text hence loses its illocutionary strength and ends upwardly beingness a representation. Aside from this "address without access," some other obtaining status for a fictional illocutionary human activity is the existence of non-referring names and descriptions in a fictional work. If an author writes a poem in which she greets the great detective Sherlock Holmes, this greeting will never obtain, because the name Sherlock Holmes does non refer to any existing person in the globe. The greeting will only cease upwards beingness a representation or a fictional illocution. Past parity of reasoning, fictional works end up being representations of illocutionary acts in that they always incorporate names or descriptions involving events that never take place.

Now we must enquire: past what criterion do we determine what illocutionary human activity is represented? It cannot be the speaker or author'southward intention, because even if a speaker intends to stand for a particular illocutionary human activity, she might end up representing another. Since the possibility of failed intention e'er exists, intention would non be an appropriate criterion. Convention is again invoked to determine the right illocutionary human activity being represented. It is true that whatsoever practise of representing is intentional at the showtime in the sense that what is represented is determined past the representer's intention. Nevertheless, once the connection betwixt a symbol and what it is used to represent is established, intention is said to exist detached from that connection, and deciding the content of a representation becomes a sheer thing of convention.

Since a fictional piece of work is essentially a representation of an comparatively performed illocutionary human activity, determining what it represents does not require u.s. to go beyond that incomplete performance, just as determining what a mime is imitating does not require the audience to consider anything exterior her operation, such as her intention. What the mime is imitating is completely determined by how nosotros conventionally metaphrase the act being performed. In a similar way, when because what illocutionary human action is represented by a fictional work, the interpreter should rely on internal evidence rather than on external show of authorial intent to construct the illocutionary act being represented. If, based on internal data, a story reads like a castigation of state of war, it is suitably seen as a representation of that illocutionary act. The conclusion is that the author'south intention plays no role in fixing the content of a fictional work.

Lastly, it is worth mentioning that Beardsley'due south mental attitude toward nonfictional works is clashing. Obviously, his speech act argument applies to fictional works just, and he accepts that nonfictional works tin can be genuine illocutions. This category of works tends to have a more identifiable audition, who is hence not addressed without access. With illocutions, Beardsley continues to fence for an anti-intentionalist view of meaning according to which the utterer's intention does not decide meaning. But his accepting nonfictional works as illocutions opens the door to considerations of external or contextual factors that become against his before stance, which is globally anti-intentionalist.

c. Notable Objections and Replies

One immediate business concern with anti-intentionalism is whether convention alone can bespeak to a single significant (Hirsch, 1967). The common reason why people contend about interpretation is precisely that the work itself does not offer sufficient prove to disambiguate significant. Very often a piece of work tin can sustain multiple meanings and the problem of choice prompts some people to entreatment to the artist's intention. It does not seem plausible to say that ane can assign merely a unmarried pregnant to works similar Ulysses or Picasso's abstruse paintings if one concentrates solely on internal evidence. To this objection, Beardsley (1970) insists that, in almost cases, appeal to the coherence of the work can eventually leave us with a single right estimation.

A 2d serious objection to anti-intentionalism is the case of irony (Hirsch, 1976, pp. 24–five). It seems reasonable to say that whether a piece of work is ironic depends on if its creator intended it to be so. For instance, based on internal evidence, many people took Daniel Defoe's pamphlet The Shortest Manner with the Dissenters to be genuinely confronting the Dissenters upon its publication. All the same, the simply ground for saying that the pamphlet is ironic seems to be Defoe's intention. If irony is a crucial component of the work, ignoring information technology would neglect to respect the work's identity. It follows that irony cannot be grounded in internal bear witness alone. Beardsley's reply (1982, pp. 203–vii) is that irony must offering the possibility of understanding. If the artist cannot imagine anyone taking it ironically, at that place would be no reason to believe the work to be ironic.

Still, the trouble of irony is only part of a bigger business organization that challenges the irrelevance of external factors to estimation. Many factors present at the time of the work's creation seem to play a key function in shaping a work's identity and content. Missing out on these factors would pb u.s. to misidentifying the work (and hence to misinterpreting it).

For case, a work volition not be seen as revolutionary unless the interpreter knows something about the contemporaneous artistic tradition: ignoring the piece of work's innovation amounts to accepting that the work can lose its revolutionary character while remaining self-identical. If nosotros see this character equally identity-relevant, we should and so accept it into consideration in our interpretation. The aforementioned line of thinking goes for other identity-conferring contextual factors, such every bit the social-historical weather condition and the relations the work bears to contemporaneous or prior works. The present view is thus called ontological contextualism to foreground the ontological claim that the identity and content of a work of art are in role adamant by the relations information technology bears to its context of production.

Contextualism leads to an important stardom between piece of work and text in the case of literature. In a nutshell: a text is not context-dependent only a work is. The anti-intentionalist stance thus leads the interpreter to consider texts rather than works because it rejects considerations of external or contextual factors. The aforementioned stardom goes for other art forms when we depict a comparing between an artistic product considered in its brute class and in its context of cosmos. For convenience, the word "work" is used throughout with notes on whether contextualism is taken or not.

As a reply to the contextualist objection, it has been argued (Davies, 2005) that Beardsley's position allows for contextualism. If this is convincing, the contextualist criticism of anti-intentionalism would not exist conclusive.

three. Value-Maximizing Theory

a. Overview

The value-maximizing theory tin can be viewed as being derived from anti-intentionalism. Its core claim is that the primary aim of fine art interpretation is to offer interpretations that maximize the value of a piece of work. At that place are at least two versions of the maximizing position distinguished by the commitment to contextualism. When the maximizing position is committed to contextualism, the constraint on interpretation volition be convention plus context (Davies, 2007); otherwise, the constraint volition exist convention only, as endorsed by anti-intentionalism (Goldman, 2013).

As indicated, the word "maximize" does not imply monism. That is, the present position does not claim that there can be only a unmarried fashion to maximize the value of a piece of work of art. On the opposite, it seems reasonable to presume that in about cases the interpreter can envisage several readings to bring out the value of the piece of work. For case, Kafka's Metamorphosis has generated a number of rewarding interpretations, and it is difficult to argue for a single best amidst them. As long as an interpretation is revealing or insightful nether the relevant interpretative constraints, we may count it as value-maximizing. Such being the instance, the value-maximizing theory may be relabelled the "value-enhancing" or "value-satisfying" theory.

Given this pluralist flick, the maximizer, different the anti-intentionalist, will need to accept the indeterminacy thesis that convention (and context, if she endorses contextualism) solitary does not guarantee the unambiguity of the piece of work. This allows the maximizing position to bypass the challenge posed by said thesis, rendering information technology a more flexible position than anti-intentionalism in regard to the number of legitimate interpretations.

Encapsulating the maximizing position in a few words: it holds that the primary aim of art interpretation is to enhance appreciative satisfaction by identifying interpretations that bring out the value of a work inside reasonable limits set up by convention (and context).

b. Notable Objections and Replies

The actual intentionalist will maintain that figurative features such every bit irony and allusion must exist analysed intentionalistically. The maximizer with contextualist commitment can counter this objection by dealing with intentions more than sophisticatedly. If the relevant features are identity conferring, they volition exist respected and accustomed in interpretation. In this case, whatsoever interpretation that ignores the intended characteristic ends upwardly misidentifying the work. But if the relevant features are not identity conferring, more room will be left for the interpreter to consider them. The intended feature can exist ignored if it does not add to the value of the work. By contrast, where such a feature is non intended just can be put in the work, the interpreter tin can all the same build it into the interpretation if information technology is value enhancing.

The well-nigh of import objection to the maximizing view has information technology that the present position is in danger of turning a mediocre work into a masterpiece. Ed Wood's film Programme 9 from Outer Infinite is the most discussed example. Many people consider this work to be the worst pic ever fabricated. Withal, interpreted from a postmodern perspective as satire—which is presumably a value-enhancing interpretation—would turn it into a classic.

The maximizer with contextualist leanings can reply that the postmodern reading fails to identify the pic as authored by Forest (Davies, 2007, p, 187). Postmodern views were not available in Wood'southward fourth dimension, and so it was impossible for the picture show to exist created as such. Identifying the film as postmodernist amounts to anachronism that disrespects the piece of work's identity. The moral of this example is that the maximizer does not blindly enhance the value of a work. Rather, the work to be interpreted needs to be contextualized offset to ensure that subsequent attributions of aesthetic value are washed in calorie-free of the truthful and fair presentation of the work.

4. Actual Intentionalism

Contra anti-intentionalism, actual intentionalism maintains that the creative person's intention is relevant to interpretation. The position comes in at least three forms, giving different weights to intention. The accented version claims that work-pregnant is fully determined by the artist'due south intention; the extreme version claims that the work ends up being meaningless when the artist's intention is incompatible with information technology; and the moderate version claims that either the artist's intention determines meaning or—if this fails—pregnant is determined instead by convention (and context, if contextualism is endorsed).

a. Accented Version

Absolute bodily intentionalism claims that a work means whatsoever its creator intends it to mean. Put otherwise, it sees the artist's intention as the necessary and sufficient condition for a work'due south significant. This position is often dubbed Humpty-Dumptyism with reference to the character Humpty-Dumpty in Through the Looking-Glass. This character tries to convince Alice that he can make a give-and-take hateful what he chooses it to mean. This unsettling determination is supported past the argument virtually intentionless meaning: a mark (or a sequence of marks) cannot take meaning unless it is produced by an agent capable of intentional activities; therefore, meaning is identical to intention.

It seems plausible to abandon the idea that marks on the sand are a verse form once nosotros know they were caused by accident. But this at best proves that intention is the necessary condition for something'due south being meaningful; information technology does not bear witness farther that what something ways is what the amanuensis intended information technology to mean. In other words, the argument most intentionless significant does a better task in showing that intention is an indispensable ingredient for meaningfulness than in showing that intention infallibly determines the meaning conveyed.

b. Extreme Version

To avert Humpty-Dumptyism, the extreme actual intentionalist rejects the view that the artist's intention infallibly determines work-pregnant and accepts the indeterminacy thesis that convention alone does not guarantee a single evident meaning to exist plant in a piece of work. The farthermost intentionalist claims further that the meaning of the piece of work is fixed by the artist'southward intention if her intention identifies ane of the possible meanings sustained by the work; otherwise, the work ends up being meaningless (Hirsch, 1967). Better put, the farthermost intentionalist sees intention equally the necessary rather than sufficient status for work-meaning.

Aside from the unsatisfactory consequence that a work becomes meaningless when the creative person'due south intention fails, the nowadays position faces a dilemma when dealing with the case of figurative language (Nathan, in Iseminger (1992)). Accept irony for case. The first horn of the dilemma is equally follows: Constrained past linguistic conventions, the range of possible meanings has to include the negation of the literal meaning in guild for the intended irony to be constructive. Just this results in absolute intentionalism: every expression would be ironic as long as the author intends it to be. But—this is the 2nd horn—if the range of possible meanings does not include the negation of literal meaning, the expression simply becomes meaningless in that in that location is no appropriate meaning possible for the writer to actualize. It seems that a broader notion of convention is needed to explicate figurative language. Only if the extreme intentionalist makes that motility, her intentionalist position will exist undermined, for the author'southward intention would exist given a less important function than convention in such cases. However, this problem does not arise when the actual intentionalist is committed to contextualism, for in that example the contextual factors that brand the intended irony possible will exist taken into account.

c. Moderate Version

Though there are several unlike versions of moderate actual intentionalism, they share the common ground that when the artist's intention fails, meaning is stock-still instead by convention and context. (Whether all moderate actual intentionalists take context into account is controversial and this article will non dig into this controversy for reasons of infinite.) That is, when the artist'southward intention is successful, it determines meaning; otherwise, significant is determined by convention plus context (Carroll, 2001; Stecker, 2003; Livingston, 2005).

Equally seen, an intention is successful so long equally it identifies one of the possible meanings sustained by the work even if the meaning identified is less plausible than other candidates. But what exactly is the interpreter doing when she identifies that meaning? It is reasonable to say that the interpreter does non demand to ascertain all the possible meanings and meet if at that place is a fit. Rather, all she needs to do is to see whether the intended meaning can exist read in accordance with the piece of work. This is why the moderate intentionalist puts the success condition in terms of compatibility: an intention is successful so long as the intended meaning is compatible with the work. The fact that a certain meaning is uniform with the piece of work ways that the work tin can sustain it as one of its possible meanings.

Unfortunately, the notion of compatibility seems to allow strange cases in which an insignificant intention can determine piece of work-pregnant every bit long equally it is non explicitly rejected by the relevant interpretative constraint. For example, if Agatha Christie reveals that Hercule Poirot is really a smart Martian in disguise, the moderate intentionalist would need to have it considering this annunciation of intention tin still exist said to be compatible with the text in the sense that information technology is not rejected by textual evidence. To avert this bad result, compatibility needs to be qualified.

The moderate intentionalist and then analyses compatibility in terms of the meshing condition, which refers to a sufficient caste of coherence between the content of the intention and the work's rhetorical patterns. An intention is uniform with the work in the sense that it meshes well with the work. The Martian case will hence exist ruled out past the meshing condition because it does not appoint sufficiently with the narrative even if it is not explicitly rejected past textual prove. The meshing condition is a minimal or weak success condition in that information technology does not require the intention to mesh with every textual feature. A sufficient corporeality will practice, though the moderate intentionalist admits that the line is not always easy to draw. With this weak standard for success, it can happen that the interpreter is not able to discern the intended meaning in the work before she learns of the artist's intention.

There is a second kind of success condition which adopts a stronger standard (Stecker, 2003; Davies, 2007, pp. 170–1). This standard for success states that an intention is successful just in case the intended pregnant, amidst the possible meanings sustained by the work, is the one most probable to secure uptake from a well-backgrounded audience (with contextual knowledge and all). For instance, if a work of art, within the limits gear up by convention and context, affords interpretations x, y, and z, and ten is more readily discerned than the other ii past the appropriate audience, and so x is the meaning of the work.

These accounts of the success status reply a notable objection to moderate intentionalism. This objection claims that moderate intentionalism faces an epistemic dilemma (Trivedi, 2001). Consider an epistemic question: how do we know whether an intention is successfully realized? Presumably, we effigy out work-pregnant and the artist's intention respectively and independently of each other. And and so we compare the two to run into if there is a fit. Notwithstanding, this motion is redundant: if we can figure out work-meaning independently of actual intention, why do we need the latter? And if work-significant cannot exist independently obtained, how tin can we know it is a example where intentions are successfully realized and not a case where intentions failed? It follows that appeal to successful intention results in redundancy or indeterminacy.

The kickoff horn of the dilemma assumes that work-meaning can be obtained independently of knowledge of successful intention, merely this is false for moderate intentionalists, for they acknowledge that in many cases the work presents ambivalence that cannot be resolved solely in virtue of internal testify. The moderate intentionalist rejects the second horn by challenge that they do not determine the success of an intention by comparison independently obtained work-pregnant with the artist's intention (Stecker, 2010, pp. 154–v). As already discussed, moderate intentionalists suggest different success weather that do not appeal to the identity between the artist's intention and work-meaning. Moderate intentionalists adopting the weak standard hold that success is defined past the degree of meshing; those who adopt the strong standard maintain that success is defined by the audience's ability to grasp the intention. Neither requires the interpreter to identify a work'south meaning independently of the artist's intention.

d. Objections to Actual Intentionalism

The most usually raised objection is the epistemic worry, which asks: is intention knowable? It seems incommunicable for one to really know others' mental states, and the epistemic gap in this respect is thus unbridgeable. Bodily intentionalists tend to dismiss this worry equally insignificant and maintain that in many contexts (daily conversation or historical investigations) we have no difficulty in discerning another person's intention (Carroll, 2009, pp. 71–five). In that example, why would things of a sudden stand differently when it comes to fine art interpretation? This is not to say that we succeed on every occasion of estimation, but that nosotros do then in an amazingly big number of cases. That being said, we should not reject the appeal to intention solely because of the occasional failure.

Some other objection is the publicity paradox (Nathan, 2006). The primary idea is this: when someone Southward conveys something p by a production of an object O for public consumption, there is a second-gild intention that the audience need non go beyond O to accomplish p; that is, there is no demand to consult S's commencement-order intentions to empathise O. Therefore, when an artist creates a work for public consumption, there is a second-order intention that her first-society intentions not be consulted, otherwise it would indicate the failure of the artist. Bodily intentionalism hence leads to the paradoxical claim that we should and should non consult the artist's intentions.

The actual intentionalist'south response (Stecker, 2010, pp. 153–4) is this: not all artists have the second-order intention in question. If this premise is false, then the publicity argument becomes unsound. Even if it were true, the argument would nevertheless be invalid, because it confuses the intention that the artist intends to create something continuing lone with the intention that her first-order intention need not be consulted. The paradox volition not agree if this stardom is made.

Lastly, many criticisms are directed at a popular argument amid bodily intentionalists: the chat argument (Carroll, 2001; Jannotta, 2014). An analogy between conversation and fine art estimation is drawn, and actual intentionalists claim that if nosotros accept that art interpretation is a form of conversation, nosotros need to accept actual intentionalism as the correct prescriptive account of interpretation, considering the standard goal of an interlocutor in a conversation is to grasp what the speaker intends to say. (This is a premise fifty-fifty anti-intentionalists accept, only they plain decline the farther claim that art interpretation is conversational. See Beardsley, 1970, ch.1.) This analogy has been severely criticized (Dickie, 2006; Nathan, 2006; Huddleston, 2012). The greatest disanalogy betwixt chat and art is that the latter is more like a monologue delivered past the artist rather than an interchange of ideas.

One way to encounter the monologue objection is to specify more clearly the role of the conversational interest. In fact, the bodily intentionalist claims that the conversational interest should constrain other interests such equally the artful interest. In other words, other interests can be reconciled or work with the conversational interest. Take the case of the hermeneutics of suspicion for example. Hermeneutics of suspicion is a skeptical attitude—oftentimes heavily politicized—adopted toward the explicit stance of a work. Interpretations based on the hermeneutics of suspicion have to exist constrained by the artist's non-ironic intention in order for them to count equally legitimate interpretations. For instance, in attributing racist tendencies to Jules Verne'due south Mysterious Isle, in which the blackness slave Neb is portrayed as docile and superstitious, nosotros need to suppose that the tendencies are not ironic; otherwise, the suspicious reading becomes inappropriate. In this example, the artistic conversation does non end upward being a monologue, for the suspicious hermeneut listens and understands Verne before responding with the suspicious reading, which is constrained by the conversational involvement. A conversational interchange is hence completed.

v. Hypothetical Intentionalism

a. Overview

A compromise between actual intentionalism and anti-intentionalism is hypothetical intentionalism, the core claim of which is that the correct meaning of a work is adamant by the best hypothesis nigh the artist's intention made by a selected audience. The aim of interpretation is then to hypothesize what the creative person intended when creating the work from the perspective of the qualified audition (Tolhurst, 1979; Levinson, 1996).

Two points call for attending. Beginning, it is hypothesis—not truth—that matters. This means that a hypothesis of the actual intention volition never be trumped by knowledge of that very intention. 2nd, the membership of the audition is crucial because it determines the kind of evidence legitimate for the interpreter to use.

A 1979 proposal (Tolhurst) suggests that the relevant audition exist singled out by the artist's intention, that is, the audition intended to be addressed past the artist. Work-meaning is thus determined by the intended audition's best hypothesis near the creative person's intention. This means that the interpreter will need to equip herself with the relevant behavior and background cognition of the intended audience in gild to make the all-time hypothesis. Put another way, hypothetical intentionalism focuses on the audition's uptake of an utterance addressed to them. This being so, what the audience relies on in comprehending the utterance volition be based on what she knows well-nigh the utterer on that particular occasion. Post-obit this contextualist line of thinking, the meaning of Jonathan Swift'due south A Modest Proposal will not be the suggestion that the poor in Republic of ireland might ease their economic pressure by selling their children every bit food to the rich; rather, given the groundwork knowledge of Swift's intended audience, the all-time hypothesis about the author'south intention is that he intended the piece of work to exist a satire that criticizes the heartless mental attitude toward the poor and Irish policy in general.

However, there is a serious trouble with the notion of an intended audience. If the intended audition is an extremely pocket-size grouping possessing esoteric knowledge of the artist, pregnant becomes a private matter, for the piece of work can simply exist properly understood in terms of private data shared between artist and audition, and this results in something shut to Humpty-Dumptyism, which is characteristic of absolute intentionalism.

To cope with this problem, the hypothetical intentionalist replaces the concept of an intended audition with that of an ideal or appropriate audition. Such an audience is non necessarily targeted past the creative person'southward intention and is ideal in the sense that its members are familiar with the public facts well-nigh the creative person and her work. In other words, the platonic audition seeks to ballast the piece of work in its context of creation based on public evidence. This avoids the danger of interpreting the work on the basis of private evidence.

The hypothetical intentionalist is enlightened that in some cases at that place will be competing interpretations which are every bit good. An aesthetic criterion is so introduced to adjudicate between these hypotheses. The artful consideration comes every bit a tie breaker: when we reach 2 or more epistemically best hypotheses, the one that makes the work artistically ameliorate should win.

Some other notable distinction introduced by hypothetical intentionalism is that between semantic and categorial intention (Levinson, 1996, pp. 188–9). The kind of intention nosotros accept been discussing is semantic: it is the intention by which an artist conveys her message in the piece of work. Past contrast, categorial intention is the artist'due south intention to categorize her production, either every bit a piece of work of art, a certain artform (such as Romantic literature), or a particular genre (such equally lyric verse). Categorial intention indirectly affects a work's semantic content because it determines how the interpreter conceptualizes the work at the primal level. For example, if a text is taken as a grocery listing rather than an experimental story, nosotros will interpret it as saying nothing across the named grocery items. For this reason, the artist's categorial intention should be treated as among the contextual factors relevant to her piece of work's identity. This move is often adopted by theorists endorsing contextualism, such as maximizers or moderate intentionalists.

b. Notable Objections and Replies

Hypothetical intentionalism has received many criticisms and challenges that merit mention. A frequently expressed worry is that it seems odd to stick to a hypothesis when newly found prove proves information technology to be false (Carroll, 2001, pp. 208–nine). If an artist's individual diary is located and reveals that our best hypothesis about her intention regarding her work is fake, why should nosotros cling to that hypothesis if the newly revealed intention meshes well with the piece of work? Hypothetical intentionalism implausibly implies that warranted assertibility constitutes truth.

The hypothetical intentionalist clarifies her position (Levinson, 2006, p. 308) by saying that warranted assertibility does not constitute the truth for the utterer's meaning, but information technology does found the truth for utterance pregnant. The ideal audience's best hypothesis constitutes utterance significant even if information technology is designed to infer the utterer's meaning.

Another troublesome objection states that hypothetical intentionalism collapses into the value-maximizing theory, for, when making the best hypothesis of what the creative person intended, the interpreter inevitably attributes to the creative person the intention to produce a piece with the highest degree of aesthetic value that the work tin sustain (Davies, 2007, pp. 183–84). That is, the epistemic criterion for determining the best hypothesis is inseparable from the aesthetic criterion.

In reply, it is claimed that this objection may stalk from the impression that an artist normally aims for the best; nonetheless, this does not imply that she would anticipate and intend the artistically best reading of the piece of work. It follows that it is not necessary that the best reading be what the artist most probable intended fifty-fifty if she could have intended it. The objector replies that, even so, the state of affairs in which we have ii epistemically plausible readings while one is junior cannot ascend, considering we would adopt the junior reading but when the superior reading is falsified by bear witness.

The third objection is that the distinction between public and private evidence is blurry (Carroll, 2001, p. 212). Is public evidence published prove? Does published information from private sources count as public? The reply from the hypothetical intentionalist emphasizes that this is not a distinction between published and unpublished information (Levinson, 2006, p. 310). The relevant public context should be reconstrued equally what the artist appears to have wanted the audience to know nearly the circumstances of the work'south creation. This ways that if it appears that the artist did not desire to make certain proclamations of intent known to the audition, and so this testify, even if published at a after point, does not constitute the public context to be considered for interpretation.

Finally, two notable counterexamples to hypothetical intentionalism have been proposed (Stecker, 2010, pp. 159–60). The showtime counterexample is that Westward means p but p is not intended past the artist and the audience is justified in believing that p is not intended. In this case hypothetical intentionalism falsely implies that W does not mean p. For case, it is famously known among readers of Sherlock Holmes adventures that Dr. Watson'south state of war wound appears in two different locations. On one occasion the wound is said to be on his arm, while on some other information technology is on his thigh. In other words the Holmes story fictionally asserts impossibility regarding Watson's wound. But given the realistic style of the Holmes adventures, the all-time hypothesis of authorial intent in this case would deny that the impossibility is part of the significant of the story, which is apparently false.

Notwithstanding, the hypothetical intentionalist would non maintain that Due west means p, because p is not the best hypothesis. She would not claim that the Holmes story fictionally asserts impossibility regarding Watson'due south wound, for the best hypothesis made by the ideal reader would be that Watson has the wound somewhere on his body—his arm or thigh, but exactly where nosotros practise not know. It is a fault to presuppose that W means p without post-obit the strictures imposed by hypothetical intentionalism to properly reach p.

The second counterexample to hypothetical intentionalism is the instance where the audience is justified in believing that p is intended past the creative person but in fact W means q; the audience would and then falsely conclude that W means p. Again, what W means is determined by the ideal audition's best hypothesis based on convention and context, not by what the piece of work literally asserts. The meaning of the work is the product of a prudent assessment of the total testify available.

6. Hypothetical Intentionalism and the Hypothetical Artist

a. Overview

At that place is a 2d variety of hypothetical intentionalism that is based on the concept of a hypothetical artist. Generally speaking, information technology maintains that interpretation is grounded on the intention suitably attributed past the interpreter to a hypothetical or imagined artist. This version of hypothetical intentionalism is sometimes called fictionalist intentionalism or postulated authorism. The theoretical appliance of a hypothetical artist can be traced dorsum to Wayne Berth's account of the "implied author," in which he suggests that the critic should focus on the author we can make out from the work instead of on the historical writer, because there is often a gap between the ii.

Though proponents of the nowadays brand of intentionalism disagree on the number of acceptable interpretations and on what kind of evidence is legitimate, they agree that the interpreter ought to concentrate on the appearance of the work. If it appears, based on internal testify (and perhaps contextual information if contextualism is endorsed), that the creative person intends the work to hateful p, then p is the right interpretation of the work. The creative person in question is non the historical creative person; rather, it is an artist postulated past the audience to exist responsible for the intention fabricated out from, or implied past, the work. For case, if there is an anti-war mental attitude detected in the piece of work, the intention to castigate war should be attributed to the postulated creative person, not to the historical creative person. The motivation backside this move is to maintain work-centered interpretation but avoid the fallacious reasoning that any we find in the work is intended by the real artist.

Inheriting the spirit of hypothetical intentionalism, fictionalist intentionalism aims to make interpretation work-based only writer-related at the same fourth dimension. The biggest divergence between the two stances is that, every bit said, fictionalist intentionalism does not entreatment to the bodily or real creative person, thereby avoiding whatsoever criticisms arising from hypothesizing well-nigh the real creative person such as that the best hypothesis nigh the existent creative person's intention should be abandoned when compelling evidence against it is obtained.

b. Notable Objections and Replies

The first concern with fictionalist intentionalism is that constructing a historical variant of the actual artist sounds suspiciously similar hypothesizing about her (Stecker, 1987). Merely there is still a divergence. "Hypothesizing about the actual artist," or more than accurately, "hypothesizing the actual artist's intention," would be a label of hypothetical intentionalism rather than fictionalist intentionalism. The latter does not track the actual artist's intention merely constructs a virtual one. Every bit shown, fictionalist intentionalism, unlike hypothetical intentionalism, is immune to whatever criticisms resulting from ignoring the actual creative person's proclamation of her intention.

A second objection criticizes fictionalist intentionalism for not being able to distinguish between different histories of creative processes for the same textual advent (Livingston, 2005, pp. 165–69). For case, suppose a work that appears to be produced with a well-conceived scheme did result from that kind of scheme; suppose farther that a second piece of work that appears the same actually emerged from an uncontrolled process. And then, if we follow the strictures of fictionalist intentionalism, the interpretations we produce for these two works would plow out to be the same, for based on the aforementioned appearance the hypothetical artists we construct in both cases would be identical. Merely these two works accept different creative histories and the difference in question seems too crucial to be ignored.

The objection here fails to consider the subtlety of reality-dependent appearances (Walton, 2008, ch. 12). For instance, suppose the exhibit note abreast a painting tells usa information technology was created when the painter got heavily boozer. Whatsoever well-organized feature in the work that appears to result from conscientious manipulation by the painter might now either expect disordered or structured in an eerie way depending on the feature's actual presentation. Compare this scenario to another where a (almost) visually indistinguishable counterpart is exhibited in the museum with the showroom notation revealing that the painter spent a long menses crafting the work. In this second instance the audience's perception of the work is not very likely to be the same every bit that in the first case. This shows how the apparent artist business relationship tin can still discriminate between (appearances of) different creative histories of the same artistic presentation.

Finally, there is often the qualm that fictionalist intentionalism ends upwardly postulating phantom entities (hypothetical creators) and phantom actions (their intendings). The fictional intentionalist can reply that she is giving descriptions only of appearances instead of quantifying over hypothetical artists or their actions.

7. Conclusion

From the in a higher place discussion we tin can detect two major trends in the fence. First, nearly late twentyth century and 21st century participants are committed to the contextualist ontology of art. The relevance of fine art's historical context, since its first philosophical appearance in Arthur Danto's 1964 essay "The Artworld," continues to influence analytic theories of art estimation. There is no sign of this tendency diminishing. In Noël Carroll'southward 2016 survey commodity on interpretation, the contextualist basis is still assumed.

Second, actual intentionalism remains the virtually popular position among all. Many substantial monographs take been written in this century to defend the position (Stecker, 2003; Livingston, 2005; Carroll, 2009; Stock 2017). This intentionalist prevalence probably results from the influence of H. P. Grice'southward work on the philosophy of language. And again, this tendency, like the contextualist vogue, is however ongoing. And if we meet intentionalism every bit an umbrella term that encompasses not only actual intentionalism but also hypothetical intentionalism and probably fictionalist intentionalism, the influence of intentionalism and its related accent on the concept of an artist or writer will be even stronger. This presents an interesting contrast with the trend in mail-structuralism that tends to downplay authorial presence in theories of interpretation, as embodied in the author-is-dead thesis championed by Barthes and Foucoult (Lamarque, 2009, pp. 104–15).

8. References and Further Reading

  • Beardsley, Thousand. C. (1970). The possibility of criticism. Detroit, MI: Wayne Country University Printing.

  • Contains 4 philosophical essays on literary criticism. The first two are amidst Beardsley'south near important contributions to the philsoophy of interpretation.

  • Beardsley, M. C. (1981a). Aesthetics: Issues in the philosophy of criticism (2nd ed.). Indianapolis, IN: Hackett.

  • A comprehensive book on philosophical issues across the arts and also a powerful statement of anti-intentionalism.

  • Beardsley, M. C. (1981b). Fiction every bit representation. Synthese, 46, 291–313.

  • Presents the speech deed theory of literature.

  • Beardsley, Thousand. C. (1982). The artful point of view: Selected essays. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Printing.

  • Contains the essay "Intentions and Interpretations: A Fallacy Revived," in which Beardsley applies his spoken communication act theory to the interpretation of fictional works.

  • Berth, W. C. (1983). The rhetoric of fiction (twond ed.). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

  • Contains the original business relationship of the implied writer.

  • Carroll, N. (2001). Beyond aesthetics: Philosophical essays. New York, NY: Cambridge University Printing.

  • Contains in detail Carroll's conversation statement, discussion on the hermenutics of suspicion, defense of moderate intentionalism, and criticism of hypothetical intentionalism.

  • Carroll, Northward. (2009). On criticism. New York, NY: Routledge.

  • An engaging book on artistic evaluation and interpretation.

  • Carroll, N., & Gibson, J. (Eds.). (2016). The Routledge companion to philosophy of literature. New York, NY: Routledge.

  • Anthologizes Carroll'southward survey commodity on the intention contend.

  • Currie, G. (1990). The nature of fiction. Cambridge, England: Cambridge Academy Press.

  • Contains a defense of fictionalist intentionalism.

  • Currie, G. (1991). Work and text. Listen, 100, 325–40.

  • Presents how a commitment to contextualism leads to an of import distinction betwixt work and text in the case of literature.

  • Danto, A. C. (1964). The artworld. Journal of Philosophy, 61, 571–84.

  • Start paper to describe attending to the relevance of a work's context of production.

  • Davies, South. (2005). Beardsley and the autonomy of the piece of work of art. Periodical of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 63, 179–83.

  • Argues that Beardsley is actually a contextualist.

  • Davies, S. (2007). Philosophical perspectives on fine art. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

  • Part II contains Davies' defense of the maximizing position and criticisms of other positions.

  • Dickie, M. (2006). Intentions: Conversations and art. British Journal of Aesthetics, 46, 71–81.

  • Criticizes Carroll'due south chat argument and actual intentionalism.

  • Goldman, A. H. (2013). Philosophy and the novel. Oxford, England: Oxford University Printing.

  • Contains a defence force of the value-maximizing theory without a contextualist commitment.

  • Hirsch, E. D. (1967). Validity in interpretation. New Haven, CT: Yale Academy Press.

  • The most representative presentation of extreme intentionalism.

  • Hirsch, E. D. (1976). The aims of interpretation. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Printing.

  • Contains a drove of essays expanding Hirsh's views on interpretation.

  • Huddleston, A. (2012). The conversation statement for actual intentionalism. British Journal of Aesthetics, 52, 241–56.

  • A brilliant criticism of Carroll's chat statement.

  • Iseminger, Thousand. (Ed.). (1992). Intention & interpretation. Philadelphia, PA: Temple Academy Press.

  • A valuable collection of essays featuring Beardsley's business relationship of the work's autonomy, Knapp and Michaels' absolute intentionalism, Iseminger's extreme intentionalism, Nathan's account of the postulated artist, Levinson's hypothetical intentionalism, and eight other contributions.

  • Jannotta, A. (2014). Interpretation and conversation: A response to Huddleston. British Journal of Aesthetics, 54, 371–80.

  • A defense force of the conversation statement.

  • Krausz, M. (Ed.). (2002). Is at that place a unmarried right interpretation? University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.

  • Some other valuable album on the intention debate, containing in particular Carroll's defense of moderate intentionalism, Lamarque's criticism of viewing piece of work-meaning as utterance meaning.

  • Lamarque, P. (2009). The philosophy of literature. Malden, MA: Blackwell.

  • The third and the quaternary chapters discuss analytic theories of interpretation along with a critical assessment of the author-is-dead claim.

  • Levinson, J. (1996). The pleasure of aesthetics: Philosophical essays. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Printing.

  • The 10th affiliate is Levinson's revised presentation of hypothetical intentionalism and the distinction betwixt semantic and categorial intention.

  • Levinson, J. (2006). Contemplating art: Essays in aesthetics. Oxford, England: Oxford University Printing.

  • Contains Levinson's replies to major objections to hypothetical intentionalism.

  • Levinson, J. (2016). Aesthetic pursuits: Essays in philosophy of art. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

  • Contains Levinson's updated defence of hypothetical intentionalism and criticism of Livingston'due south moderate intentionalism.

  • Livingston, P. (2005). Art and intention: A philosophical study. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

  • A thorough discussion on intention, literary ontology, and the problem of interpretation, with emphases on defending the meshing condition and on the criticisms of the ii versions of hypothetical intentionalism.

  • Nathan, D. O. (1982). Irony and the artist's intentions. Periodical of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 22, 245–56.

  • Criticizes the notion of an intended audience.

  • Nathan, D. O. (2006). Art, meaning, and creative person's significant. In Thou. Kieran (Ed.), Gimmicky debates in aesthetics and the philosophy of fine art (pp. 282–93). Oxford, England: Blackwell.

  • Presents an account of fictionalist intentionalism, a critique of the conversation argument, and a brief recapitulation of the publicity paradox.

  • Nehamas, A. (1981). The postulated author: Disquisitional monism equally a regulative ideal. Disquisitional Enquiry, 8, 133–49.

  • Presents another version of fictionalist intentionalism.

  • Stecker, R. (1987). 'Apparent, Implied, and Postulated Authors', Philosophy and Literature 11, pp 258-71.

  • Criticizes unlike versions of fictionalist intentionalism

  • Stecker, R. (2003). Estimation and construction: Art, speech, and the law. Oxford, England: Blackwell.

  • A valuable monograph devoted to the intention debate and its related issues such every bit the ontology of fine art, incompatible interpretations and the awarding of theories of art interpretation to law. The volume defends moderate intentionalism in particular.

  • Stecker, R. (2010). Aesthetics and the philosophy of fine art: An introduction. Lanham, Doctor: Rowman & Littlefield.

  • Contains a chapter that presents the disjunctive formulation of moderate intentionalism and the two counterexamples to hypothetical intentionalism.

  • Stecker, R., & Davies, S. (2010). The hypothetical intentionalist'south dilemma: A reply to Levinson. British Journal of Aesthetics, l, 307–12.

  • Counterreplies to Levinson'south replies to criticisms of hypothetical intentionalism.

  • Stock, K. (2017). Simply imagine: Fiction, interpretation, and imagination. Oxford, England: Oxford Academy Press.

  • Contains a defence force of absolute (the writer uses the term "farthermost") intentionalism.

  • Tolhurst, W. East. (1979). On what a text is and how it means. British Periodical of Aesthetics, 19, 3–xiv.

  • The founding document of hypothetical intentionalism.

  • Trivedi, S. (2001). An epistemic dilemma for actual intentionalism. British Journal of Aesthetics, 41, pp. 192–206.

  • Presents an epistemic dilemma for actual intentionalism and defence of hypothetical intentionalism.

  • Walton, K. 50. (2008). Marvelous images: On values and the arts. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

  • A collection of essays, including "Categories of Art," which might have inspired Levinson'southward conception of categorial intention; and "Fashion and the Products and Processes of Art," which is a defense of fictionalist intentionalism in terms of the notion "credible artist."

  • Wimsatt, Due west. K., & Beardsley, Thousand. C. (1946). The intentional fallacy. The Sewanee Review, 54, 468–88.

  • The commencement thorough presentation of anti-intentionalism, commonly regarded as starting point of the intention debate.

Writer Information

Szu-Yen Lin
E-mail: lsy17@ulive.pccu.edu.tw
Chinese Culture Academy
Taiwan